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1 Introduction
Procurement plays an important role both in the public and private sector. In
Europe public procurement represented around 17% of the GDP in 2007.1 In many
sectors of the industry the role of procurement is even more pronounced. The con-
sulting company Oliver Wyman reports that suppliers are responsible for roughly
60% of the value added of a car.2 Hence, small savings in average procurement
costs translate to a substantial increase in overall profit margins.
In the past few decades reverse auctions have been established as one of the main
tools to select suppliers and to determine prices in many industries. Depending
on factors like size or complexity of a project, the procurement designer usually
commits to a certain auction format. In the academic literature on auctions, it is
typically assumed that the auction designer chooses between a first-price or second-
price payment rule and decides if she wants to conduct a static or dynamic auction.
In the static formats, each bidder submits a sealed bid and the lowest bidder gets
the contract. The dynamic formats typically considered are the Dutch auction and
the English auction. In the English auction the price is decreased over time and
bidders can drop out. It ends when the second-last bidder drops out. The winner
is the last active bidder and he is paid the last displayed price. In the English
auction the price increases over time and the first bidder who accepts the current
price receives the contract and is paid the accepted price. In addition to the four
auctions formats described, the auction designer could also determine the number
of stages.
In single-stage auctions, suppliers hand in an offer once and the contract is
allocated based on these offers. In multi-stage auctions, the first rounds are usually
conducted to reduce the set of suppliers that can participate in the final round.3
Talks with practitioners suggest that especially in strategically important projects,
multi-stage auctions are the preferred choice.
1Internal Market Scoreboard, no 19, July 2009
2https://www.oliverwyman.com/our-expertise/industries/automotive/
procurement.html
3Note that in these mechanisms, suppliers are typically restricted to hand in (weakly)
more attractive offers in subsequent rounds.
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Interestingly, economic theory suggests that the use of multi-stage mechanisms
cannot increase revenues above those that are achievable by one-stage mechanisms4
when agents have standard preferences. However, if bidders are loss averse, the
auction designer can increase her revenue by conducting multi-stage mechanisms.
Proceeding to the next stage affects a bidder’s winning probability and he therefore
adjusts his reference point. The auction designer can exploit her influence on the
bidders’ reference points. Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume reference
points are based on rational expectations.5
A supplier who proceeds to the final stage of the multi-stage mechanism up-
dates his winning probability. He knows that winning is now more likely than
before. Loss aversion implies that such a bidder gets more attached to winning
and is willing to make a more attractive offer, since losing in the final round would
cause a high disutility. These additional gains and losses are anticipated by the
agent before the auction and factored into his first-round bid. A straightforward
way of implementing such a mechanism is by conducting a two-stage tournament.
Suppliers compete in two semifinals and only the best supplier of each semifinal
proceeds to the final stage.6
In line with von Wangenheim (2019), we assume that bidders evaluate outcomes
in two dimensions, a money dimension and a good dimension.7 Consider a key
account manager working for a supplier of a car manufacturer. When competing
for a strategically important contract, he thinks in two independent dimensions:
In the money domain, all monetary details such as his own costs, negotiated piece
prices, investments etc. are captured. Independent of these details, the manager
evaluates his chances of winning the contract and therefore getting a high level of
4We consider settings in which the time between the different stages is rather short
and suppliers cannot adjust their product during the auction.
5There is an ongoing debate on how the reference point is formed. Some studies suggest
that it is mainly driven by expectations, whereas others hold that it is mostly given by
the status quo. For a discussion see Heffetz and List (2014) and references therein.
6If the number of suppliers is odd, one can conduct semifinals that are symmetric in
expectation.
7Lange and Ratan (2010) compare how the consideration of a one-dimensional reference
point differs from the consideration of a two-dimensional reference point. They show that it
can strongly affect predictions and argue that in most real world settings the consideration
of a two-dimensional reference point is more reasonable.
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recognition within his company. If this is the case, the buyer of the car manufacturer
could exploit this behavior when designing her procurement mechanism.
In this paper, we first derive a revenue equivalence principle for bidders that
are loss averse in the good domain. For a fixed multi-stage structure, meaning
which and how many bidders advance in the individual stages, the auctioneer’s
revenue is not dependent on the payment rule she chooses. This result considerably
simplifies the analyses and allows us to concentrate on the structure of multi-stage
mechanisms. Furthermore, as a side result, this entails that all single-stage static
auctions lead to the same expected costs.
The main result of this paper is that the symmetric two-stage tournament
always leads to a decrease in procurement costs compared to any (standard) single-
stage auction. This result is robust, as it does not require knowledge about bidders’
loss aversion. Hence, by conducting such a mechanism, the procurement designer’s
revenue strictly improves compared to all standard auctions if agents are loss averse,
and makes no difference if not.
Finally, we derive the optimal efficient two-stage mechanism. When conducting
two-stage mechanisms the procurement designer is confronted with a trade-off: On
the one hand, she wants to maximize the attachment to winning the contract, and
hence induce large winning probabilities to low-cost types. On the other hand, she
can not neglect high-cost types, either. If high-cost types have an already very low
chance of winning the project, they might insure themselves from a deviation from
their expectation by bidding even lower. Taking into account the bidders’ degree
of loss aversion, the optimal mechanism thus creates the level of uncertainty that
optimally solves this trade-off.
2 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to the literature on expectations-based loss aversion. The
concept of loss aversion has been studied since the seminal paper of Kahneman,
Knetsch, and Thaler (1990). In their paper, they introduce the endowment effect
and experimentally show that a subjects’ valuation for a certain good increases
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when they are physically endowed with the good. According to this strand of
literature subjects have a reference point and a deviation from this reference point
in direction of losses has a larger impact on utility than a deviation in direction of
gains.
A discussion around the formation of these reference points has risen in the
literature. Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006) suggest that the reference point is based on
rational expectations. In an auction, this means that bidders have a certain proba-
bility of winning in mind and feel losses and gains compared to these expectations.
As a consequence, a bidder expecting to win a good with a high probability suffers
more from not winning than if he gauged his chances of winning as slim.
Our paper is most closely related to von Wangenheim (2019), who compares
a sealed-bid second-price auction to an English auction assuming that bidders are
loss averse and that their reference point is given by rational expectations. While
both formats are strategically equivalent in independent private value settings if
bidders have standard preferences, he shows that the second-price sealed-bid auction
dominates the English auction if bidders are loss averse. The intuition is as follows:
At the beginning of the English auction a bidder has the same chance of winning as
in the second-price sealed-bid auction. However, during the course of the English
auction the winning probability decreases and the bidder becomes less attached to
the good. As a consequence, his willingness to pay decreases and he will drop out
before the price is reached that he would have bid in the second-price sealed-bid
auction.
Similar to von Wangenheim (2019), Ehrhart and Ott (2014) compare two stan-
dard auction formats for bidders with reference-dependent preferences. Comparing
the Dutch auction to the English auction they show that the Dutch auction out-
performs the English auction. The intuition is closely related to von Wangenheim
(2019) and to our paper. For a given valuation a bidder has the same winning prob-
ability at the beginning of the Dutch auction and the English auction. However,
while the winning probability decreases during the course of the English auction,
it increases during the course of the Dutch auction. Hence, the attachment to the
good is larger in the Dutch auction and bidders are thus willing to bid more ag-
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gressively. Similarly, a bidder who advances a stage in our setting also updates his
winning probability and therefore his attachment to the good increases. This, in
return, increases the bid he is willing to submit.
Banerji and Gupta (2014) and Rosato and Tymula (2019) provide evidence
for the effect of expectations-based loss aversion in auction environments. In a
setting in which participants compete in a second-price auction for a real good,
they observe that bidders bid less when their winning probability was smaller. This
observation stands in contrast to the predictions of standard theory which implies
that subjects have a dominant strategy of bidding their true valuation independent
of their winning probability. In contrast to that, loss aversion implies that a bidder
with a higher chance of winning is more attached to the good and, hence, willing
to bid more.
In contrast to the existing paper on auctions with loss averse bidders, we do not
concentrate on comparing standard auction formats but investigate the following
question: How can an auctions designer exploit bidders’ loss aversion to increase
her revenue?
Given this research question our work is also related to Maskin and Riley (1984)
who also investigate how the auction designer can increase her revenue if bidders
have a behavioral bias, in their case risk aversion. Similar to us, they present an op-
timal mechanism that needs to be fine-tuned to bidders’ risk preferences and seems
too complex to be implemented in practice. While our management implication
is that simple two-stage mechanisms outperform one-stage auctions if bidders are
loss averse, they show that first-price auctions outperform second-price auctions if
bidders are risk averse.
Another related paper is Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2007). They analyze
how the auction designer can exploit regret aversion of bidders. They show that
the right information design, namely revealing the best bid but concealing all other
bids, allows the auction designer to increase her revenue.
6
3 Model
In this section, we introduce the formal model. We consider n ≥ 2 ex-ante symmet-
ric bidders competing for one indivisible good. The value vi of bidder i ∈ {1, . . . , n}
for the good is privately drawn from a distribution F , vi
iid.∼ F [0, 1]. F is assumed
to have a differentiable density f which is strictly positive on its support [0, 1].
Moreover, F is common knowledge. Bids are placed after learning the value for the
good.
For loss aversion we follow Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006). We assume that bidders
are loss averse in the good domain g representing the item the winner of the auction
receives.8 Furthermore, we assume bidders to be narrow-bracketers, following the
definition of von Wangenheim (2019). Let xm be the price a bidder pays if he wins
and xg a binary variable that is equal to one if the bidder wins the good and zero
else. For an outcome x = (xc, xg), valuation v for the good, and the reference
consumption rg ∈ {0, 1}, agent’s utility is given by
u(x
∣∣rg) = xc + vxg + µg(vxg − vrg). (1)
Following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), we assume µg to be a piecewise linear function
with a kink at zero,
µg(y) =

ηgy if y ≥ 0
λgηgy if y < 0.
(2)
Here µg denotes the gain-loss utilities in the good dimension, where ηg > 0 and
λg > 1. We assume non-dominance-of-gain-loss-utility, which means for a multi-
stage mechanism with k stages ηg(λg − 1) ≤ 1/k.9 The importance of the non-
dominance-of-gain-loss-utility bounds on ηi and λi are laid out in Herweg, Mu¨ller,
and Weinschenk (2010). To summarize, if ηg(λg−1) > 1/k, a decision maker might
choose stochastically dominated choices because he ex-ante expects to experience a
net loss. For example, such a decision maker might choose a payment of zero over
8We assume that bidders are not loss averse in the money domain. This assumption
is in line with Horowitz and McConnell (2003), who argue that the endowment effect is
”highest for non-market goods, next highest for ordinary private goods, and lowest for
experiments involving forms of money.”
9This bound for non-dominance-of-gain-loss-utility is derived in Section 4.1.2.
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a lottery with slim chances of winning a strictly positive amount of money to avoid
the disappointment, should he lose.
The interpretation of this gain-loss utility is that bidders perceive, in addition
to their classical utility, a feeling of gain or loss, depending on the deviation from
their reference consumption.
The reference point in our paper is assumed to be determined by rational ex-
pectations following Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006).
3.1 Equilibrium concept
Following von Wangenheim (2019), we adapt Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)’s equilib-
rium concept under uncertainty, according to which bidders form their strategy
after learning their valuation. We apply the concept of unacclimated personal equi-
libria, which is, as argued by Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006), the appropriate concept
in auction settings. Fixing the opponents’ strategies, let H(b, vi) denote i’s payoff
distribution given his draw vi from a continuous distribution F (v) and his bid b. A
bid b∗ constitutes an unacclimated personal equilibrium (UPE), if for all b
U [H(b∗, vi)
∣∣H(b∗, vi)] ≥ U [H(b, vi)∣∣H(b∗, vi)]. (3)
That means, given your reference point is determined by the payoff distribution
resulting from an (exogenous) bid b∗, it is a best response to bid b∗.
3.2 Multi-stage mechanisms
In a multi-stage mechanism, bidders participate in k stages and submit a bid in each
one of them. The rules of the mechanism include how many stages there are and
which bidders advance to the next stage. Bids are binding and cannot be lowered
in subsequent stages.
As an example, consider four bidders and a mechanism with two stages. In the
first stage, the semi-final, all four bidders submit an offer. The two bidders with
the highest offers then advance to the final, where they submit another offer. The
highest offer in the final is then the winner of the auction.10
10We call this mechanism the “play-offs”, it is analysed in section subsubsection 4.1.3.
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In this section, we introduce the formal notation for multi-stage mechanisms.
To completely characterize a multi-stage structure, we need to define the number
of stages k and for each of the k stages, which of the bidders advance to the next
stage. For N bidders, let B =
{
jB1,
jB2, . . . ,
jBN
}
be the set of bids for each
bidder in a stage j ≤ k. We restrict ourselves to multi-stage mechanisms that are
symmetric in expectation. This means that in some stage j of the mechanism, each
bidder has the same expectation of number of opponents he is facing even if there
are asymmetric groups.11 Borrowing from order statistics notation, a multi-stage
mechanism is then defined by
(
µ,M
)
, with µ the payment rule and
M =

{
o1,
set of bidders
advancing to
stage 2︷ ︸︸ ︷
a1⋃
i=1
{
1B
(o1)
i
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 1
,
{
o2,
a2⋃
i=1
{
2B
(o2)
i
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 2
, . . . ,
{
ok,
highest bidder
wins the good
in final stage︷ ︸︸ ︷{
kB
(ok)
1
} }
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage k
. (4)
Here the oj are the number of bidders per subgroup in stage j and aj the number
of bidders advancing from stage j to j+ 1.12 It must hold that ai ≤ oi and oj ≤ N
where N is the total number of bidders.
11If there are asymmetric groups, the probability of being matched to a specific group
has to be stated.
12This implies that only the highest oj+1 bidders of each subgroup advance from stage
j to j + 1.
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4 Analysis
The theory section is structured as follows. In Section 4.1 we derive general prop-
erties of the equilibrium bidding behavior in one- and multi-stage mechanisms. In
Section 4.2 we show that fixing the multi-stage structure implies a revenue equiva-
lence principle: the chosen payment rule does not affect the expected revenue of a
mechanism. We then present a robust, easily implementable improvement over one-
stage mechanisms in Section 4.3 and finally derive the optimal efficient two-stage
mechanism in Section 4.4.
4.1 Bidding behavior
4.1.1 One-stage mechanisms
Assume that the bidders have standard preferences and let bidders participate in
a standard auction A.13 Further assume that the other bidders bid according to
an increasing and absolutely continuous bidding function βA. The payment rule of
the auction is denoted by µA(bi, b−i) and the expected payment by mA(bi). Define
G(b) := F
(N−1)
1 ◦βA
−1
(b) the winning probability with a bid b in the auction. Then
the expected utility of bidder i having value vi and bidding b is given by
uAi (vi, b) = G(b)v −mA(b). (5)
We now introduce loss aversion with bidders being loss averse only in the good
domain. Given a reference bid b∗, the expected utility is then given by
uAi (vi, b|b∗) = G(b)v −mA(b)
feeling of gain, good domain +G(b)(1−G(b∗))µg(v − 0) (6)
feeling of loss, good domain + (1−G(b))G(b∗)µg(0− v)
= G(b)v −mA(b)
+G(b)(1−G(b∗))ηgv (7)
+ (1−G(b))G(b∗)ηgλg(−v)
13Krishna (2009) defines a standard auction as an auction where the person who bids
the highest amount is awarded the object.
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Bidders optimize uAi with respect to b.
4.1.2 Multi-stage mechanisms
As a first step, we show that in equilibrium, bidders submit the same bid in every
stage of the mechanism if non-dominance-of-gain-loss-utility holds.
Proposition 1. In a multi-stage mechanism, bidders submit the same bid in every
stage.
Consider bidder i. Assume the other bidders bid according to an increasing,
absolutely continuous bidding function βMSj , where j denotes the stage. The struc-
ture of the multi-stage mechanism, i.e. how many bidders advance in the individual
stages and how many opponents they face in each stage, is then encoded in the prob-
abilities to reach the individual stages of the mechanism. Let φj be defined such
that φj ◦ F ◦ βMS−1j is the probability of reaching stage j + 1 given the bidder
reached stage j. 14 Let ~b = (b1, b2, . . . , bk) be the vector of bids of bidder 1. This
means that the ex-ante probability to win the auction is given by
Probex-ante(win with b) =
k∏
j=1
φj(bj) =: H
(
~b
)
. (8)
Note that to simplify the notation, we define that advancing to stage k + 1 means
winning the auction.
It is useful to define the probability to reach stage l, given that the bidder
reached stage i. Let i < l. Then Φli is given by
Prob
(
get to l with ~b
∣∣ get to i with ~b) (9)
=
Prob
(
get to l with ~b & get to i with ~b
)
Prob
(
get to i with ~b
) (10)
=
Prob
(
get to l with ~b
)
Prob
(
get to i with ~b
) = l−1∏
j=i
φj(bj) := Φ
l
i
(
~b
)
(11)
14The φj ◦F are expressions of probability and thus inherit the properties of the original
distribution functions.
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The probability to win the auction given the bidder reached stage i is given by
Prob(win with ~b | reached i) = Φk+1i
(
~b
)
. (12)
For each stage l, given a reference bid b∗l , the bidder experiences a gain-loss utility
in expectation. On one hand, the bidder might win with his bid bl but has expected
to lose with the reference bid b∗l . He then experiences a gain in the good domain
with respect to the reference outcome. On the other hand, the bidder might lose
in one of the stages with his bid bl but has expected to win with the reference bid
b∗l . He then experiences a loss in the good domain. This holds true for every stage.
Consider a standard auction based payment rule, µMS . The expected payment
of the multi-stage mechanism composed by the expected amount a bidder has to
pay and the probability of him having to pay it,
mMS
(
~b
)
= Prob
(
having to pay with ~b
)
E
[
µMS
∣∣∣ ~b,~b−i ] (13)
=: Ppay
(
~b
)
E
[
µMS
∣∣∣ ~b,~b−i ]. (14)
For the first-, second-, . . . -price auction, we have Ppay
(
~b
)
= H
(
~b
)
, while for the
all-pay auction we have that Ppay
(
~b
)
= 1. Generally, Ppay
(
~b
)
either depends
linearly on the φi for i ∈ {1, . . . , k} or is constant.15 This means that it holds for
all j < k,
∂ mMS
(
~b
)
∂
(
φj
(
~b
)) ≤ mMS
(
~b
)
φj
(
~b
) . (15)
Combining the results from above, we arrive at the following utility function for
15The fringe case where E
[
µMS
∣∣∣ ~b,~b−i ] consists of a lottery that explicitly depends
on a φi with i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1} is excluded here. The lottery may depend on ~b.
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loss averse bidders in multi-stage mechanisms,
uMS(vi,~b | ~b∗) = H
(
~b
)
vi −mMS
(
~b
)
+
k∑
i=1
Φk+11
(
~b
) (
1− Φi+1i
(
~b∗
) )
µg(v − 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expecting to win with ~b, to lose with ~b∗
(16)
+
k∑
i=1
Φi0
(
~b
) (
1− Φi+1i
(
~b
) )
Φk+1i
(
~b∗
)
µg(0− v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
expecting to lose with ~b, to win with ~b∗
= H
(
~b
)
vi −mMS
(
~b
)
+
k∑
i=1
Φk+11
(
~b
) (
1− Φi+1i
(
~b∗
) )
ηgv (17)
+
k∑
i=1
(
Φi0
(
~b
)
− Φi+10
(
~b
) )
Φk+1i
(
~b∗
)
ηgλg(−v).
Note that we can bound mMS from above depending on vi and ~b
∗ since a bidder
will not submit bids that result in a negative expected utility,
uMS(vi,~b | ~b∗)
!
> 0
⇒ mMS
(
~b
)
!
< H
(
~b
)
vi
+
k∑
i=1
Φk+11
(
~b
) (
1− Φi+1i
(
~b∗
) )
ηgv
+
k∑
i=1
Φi0
(
~b
) (
1− Φi+1i
(
~b
) )
Φk+1i
(
~b∗
)
ηgλg(−v).
(18)
Also note that the right-hand side does not contain bj outside of φj for all j ∈
{1, . . . , k − 1}. This means that for the first k − 1 stages, a bidder can directly
optimize over the probability of advancing to the next stage instead of optimizing
over the bids that induce probabilities. Our equilibrium concept is UPE, this implies
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that the first-order condition for i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, is given by
∂uMS(vi,~b | ~b∗)
∂ (φi(bi))
∣∣∣∣∣
~b∗=~b
=
k∏
j=1
φj(bj)
φi(bi)
vi −
∂mMS
(
~b
)
∂ (φi(bi))
(19)
+
∂
∂ (φi(bi))
k∑
l=1
k∏
j=1
φj(bj)
(
1− Φl+1l
(
~b∗
) )
ηgvi
∣∣∣∣∣
~b∗=~b
(20)
+
∂
∂ (φi(bi))
k∑
l=1
l−1∏
j=0
φj(bj)Φ
k+1
l
(
~b∗
)
ηgλg(−vi)
∣∣∣∣∣
~b∗=~b
(21)
− ∂
∂ (φi(bi))
k∑
l=1
l∏
j=0
φj(bj)Φ
k+1
l
(
~b∗
)
ηgλg(−vi)
∣∣∣∣∣
~b∗=~b
. (22)
We now rearrange the terms. (20) simplifies to
k∑
l=1
∏k
j=1 φj(bj)
φi(bi)
(
1− φl(bl)
)
ηgvi. (23)
For (21), we get
k∑
l=i+1
∏l−1
j=1 φj(bj)
φi(bi)
k∏
j=l
φj(bj)η
gλg(−vi) =
k∑
l=i+1
∏k
j=1 φj(bj)
φi(bi)
ηgλg(−vi) (24)
=
∏k
j=1 φj(bj)
φi(bi)
ηgλg(−vi)(k − i). (25)
For (22), we get
−
k∑
l=i
∏l
j=1 φj(bj)
φi(bi)
k∏
j=l
φj(bj)η
gλg(−vi) = −
k∑
l=i
∏k
j=1 φj(bj)
φi(bi)
φl(bl)η
gλg(−vi). (26)
Define
α :=
∏k
j=1 φj(bj)
φi(bi)
. (27)
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We arrive at
∂uMS(vi,~b | ~b∗)
∂ (φi(bi))
∣∣∣∣∣
~b∗=~b
= −
∂mMS
(
~b
)
∂ (φi(bi))
+ αvi + η
gviα
k∑
l=1
(1− φl(bl)) (28)
− ηgλgviα(k − i) + ηgλgvi
k∑
l=i
φl(bl)
≥ −
mMS
(
~b
)
φi(bi)
+ αvi + η
gviα
k∑
l=1
(1− φl(bl)) (29)
− ηgλgviα(k − i) + ηgλgvi
k∑
l=i
φl(bl)
≥ −
H (~b) vi + k∑
i=1
Φk+11
(
~b
)(
1− Φi+1i
(
~b∗
))
ηgvi
+
k∑
i=1
Φi0
(
~b
)(
1− Φi+1i
(
~b
))
Φk+1i
(
~b∗
)
ηgλg(−vi)

~b∗=~b
(30)
+ αvi + η
gviα
k∑
l−1
(1− φl(bl))
− ηgλgviα(k − i) + ηgλgvi
k∑
l=i
φl(bl)
= −αvi + ηg(λg − 1)viα
k∑
l=1
(1− φl(bl))
+ αvi + η
gviα
k∑
l−1
(1− φl(bl)) (31)
− ηgλgviα(k − i) + ηgλgvi
k∑
l=i
φl(bl)
= ηgλgviα(i−
i−1∑
l=1
φl) > 0. (32)
Note that we need to make sure that the expression in the brackets in step (30) is
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positive for all φj . This means it needs to hold that
αvi − ηg(λg − 1)viα
k∑
l=1
(1− φl(bl))
!≥ 0 (33)
⇔ −ηg(λg − 1) !≥ −1
k∑
l=1
(1− φl(bl))
(34)
⇔ ηg(λg − 1) !≤ 1
k∑
l=1
(1− φl(bl))
(35)
⇔ ηg(λg − 1) !≤ min
φ
1
k∑
l=1
(1− φl(bl))
(36)
⇒ ηg(λg − 1) !≤ 1
k
. (37)
For every stage, a bidder experiences gain-loss utility. All-in-all, this means that the
non-dominance of gain-loss utility has to hold for every stage, in total ηg(λg− 1) !≤
1
k .
Interpreting φj as the distribution of bids that a bidder needs to beat in ex-
pectation to order to advance to stage j + 1, (32) implies that a bidder will always
want to induce the highest possible probability to advance to the final stage with
his bid ~b. This implies that a bidder will cap his bids in stages 1 to k − 1 by the
bid he submits in the final, pay-off relevant stage. A bidder therefore optimizes
uMS(vi, b|b∗) = G(b)vi −mMS(b)
+
k∑
i=1
Φk+11 (b)
(
1− Φi+1i (b∗)
)
ηgv
+
k∑
i=1
(
Φi0(b)− Φi+10 (b)
)
Φk+1i (b
∗)ηgλg(−v)
(38)
over b.
4.1.3 Example: First-price sealed-bid play-offs
To get an idea what such a multi-stage mechanism can look like and of how to apply
what we’ve derived so far, let us take a look at the following multi-stage mechanism
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Figure 1: The first-price sealed-bid play-offs.
with four bidders. As can be seen in Figure 1, the FPSB play-offs consists of 2
stages.
1. Out of the four bidders, the two highest bidders are advancing to the second
stage.
2. Out of the two remaining bidders, the highest bid wins.
We can write MPO as
MPO =

{
4,
{
B
(4)
1 , B
(4)
2
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 1
,
{
2,
{
B
(2)
1
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 2
. (39)
The payment rule µ is given by the first-price auction payment rule. With propo-
sition 1, we can assume bidders to bid the same in every stage. Assume the other
bidders bid according to an increasing, absolutely continuous bidding function βP .
In the first stage, bidder i advances if he beats at least the second highest opponent.
This yields
φ1 ◦ F = F (3)2 = 3F 2 − 2F 3. (40)
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Given that the bidder reached stage two, the bidder wins if he beats his strongest
opponent,
φ2 ◦ F ◦ βP−1(b) = Prob
(
b > βP
(
v
(3)
1
) ∣∣∣ b > βP (v(3)2 )) (41)
=
F
(
βP
−1
(b)
)3
3F
(
βP−1(b)
)2 − 2F (βP−1(b))3 . (42)
The underlying auction format is the first-price auction, the expected payment is
given by mT (b) = G(b)b. The utility is then given by
uP (vi, b|b∗) = G(b (vi − b)
+F
(3)
1
(
βP
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (3)2
(
βP
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgv︸ ︷︷ ︸
win but would have lost in stage 1 with b∗
+F
(3)
1
(
βP
−1
(b)
)(
1−
F
(3)
1
(
βP
−1
(b∗)
)
F
(3)
2
(
βP−1 (b∗)
) )ηgv︸ ︷︷ ︸
win but would have lost in stage 2 with b∗
+
(
1− F (3)2
(
βP
−1
(b)
))
F
(3)
1
(
βP
−1
(b∗)
)
ηgλ(−v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
don’t advance to 2nd stage but would have won with b∗
+F
(3)
2
(
βP
−1
(b)
)(
1−
F
(3)
1
(
βP
−1
(b)
)
F
(3)
2
(
βP−1 (b)
) )F (3)1
(
βP
−1
(b∗)
)
F
(3)
2
(
βP−1 (b∗)
) ηgλ(−v)︸ ︷︷ ︸
get to 2nd stage & lose but would have won with b∗
.
(43)
We are interested in finding the equilibrium bidding function for this multi-stage
auction. Our equilibrium concept is UPE, this implies that the first-order condition
is given by (
∂uP (vi, b|b∗)
∂b
)∣∣∣∣∣
b∗=βP (vi)
!
= 0. (44)
In equilibrium it holds that b = βP (vi). To simplify notation, let F
(3)
m =: Fm. The
resulting ordinary differential equation admits a closed form solution,
βP (vi) =
1
F1(vi)
∫ vi
0
s
(
f1(s) + η
gλg
(
f2(s)F1(s)−
(
f2(s)− f1(s)
)F1(s)
F2(s)
)
+ ηgf1(s)
(
2− F1(s)
F2(s)
− F2(s)
))
ds.
(45)
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4.2 Revenue equivalence principle
In this section, we show that once we fix the multi-stage structure of the pro-
curement mechanism, a revenue equivalence principle holds. This means that an
auctioneer does not need to worry about the payment rule of her mechanism.16
Proposition 2 (Revenue equivalence principle for loss averse bidders). Suppose
that values are independently and identically distributed and that bidders are loss
averse in the good domain. Fix the multi-stage structure M. For every standard
auction payment rule µ, any symmetric and increasing equilibrium such that the ex-
pected payment of a bidder with value zero is zero, yields the same expected revenue
to the seller.
Consider multi-stage mechanism MS =
(
µ,M
)
, with µ some standard auction
payment rule, and fix a symmetric, strictly increasing equilibrium bidding function
βMS . Let mMS(vi) be the equilibrium expected payment in the mechanism by
bidder i with value vi. Suppose that β
MS is such that mMS(0) = 0. Define the
ex-ante expected gain-loss utility in the good domain Θg such that
Θg(b| b∗) :=
k∑
i=1
Φk+11 (b)
(
1− Φi+1i (b∗)
)
ηgv
+
k∑
i=1
(
Φi0(b)− Φi+10 (b)
)
Φk+1i (b
∗)ηgλg(−v),
(46)
yielding
uMS(vi, b|b∗) = G(b)vi −mMS(b) + Θg(b| b∗). (47)
Consider bidder i and suppose other bidders are following the equilibrium strategy
βMS . Consider the expected payoff of bidder i with value vi deviating from the
equilibrium bidding strategy. βMS is bijective, meaning that every sensible bid b
can be expressed such that b = βMS(z). The bidding function βMS constitutes a
UPE if and only if the utility function uMSi (vi, b|βMS(vi)) attains its maximum at
16We consider payment rules based on standard auctions as defined by Krishna (2009).
A standard auction is an auction where the highest bidder wins.
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b = βMS(vi) for all vi. Bidder i’s expected payoff is given by
uMS
(
vi, β
MS(z)|βMS(vi)
)
= G(βMS(z))vi −mMS(z)
+ Θ
(
βMS(z)| βMS(vi)
)
.
(48)
The first-order condition is given by
∂uMS
(
vi, β
MS(z)|βMS(vi)
)
∂z
= f
(N−1)
1 (z)vi −
∂
∂z
mMS(z)
+
∂
∂z
Θ
(
βMS(z)| βMS(vi)
) !
= 0.
(49)
In equilibrium it is optimal to report z = vi and it holds that b
∗ = βMS(vi), so we
obtain that for all y,
∂
∂y
mMS(z) = f
(N−1)
1 (y)y +
(
∂
∂y
Θ
(
βMS(y)| βMS(z)))∣∣∣∣∣
z=y
. (50)
This means that
mMS(vi) =

mMS(0) +
∫ vi
0
f
(N−1)
1 (y)ydy
+
∫ vi
0
(
∂
∂y
Θ
(
βMS(y)| βMS(z)))∣∣∣∣∣
z=y
dy.
(51)
While the right-hand side depends on the multi-stage structure M, it does not
depend on the payment rule µ.
The result holds for k ≥ 1 stages, so one-stage mechanisms are included. A
first application of the RET for loss averse bidders is to rank the English auction
with loss averse bidders.
Proposition 3. All standard auction formats yield higher expected revenues with
loss averse bidders than the English auction.
From von Wangenheim (2019) we know that the English auction performs worse
than the second-price auction revenue-wise. We can apply Proposition 2 to complete
the proof.
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4.3 A robust improvement over one-stage mechanisms
A mechanism that is to be implemented in real-life and that exploits bidders’ loss
aversion should not depend on the parameters for loss aversion. An auctioneer
cannot hope to be able to accurately estimate these parameters in a way that
would help her design a mechanism. We will show that for a parameter space that
includes the empirically found loss aversion parameters, it is beneficial for the seller
to implement a simple two-stage mechanism for every value realization of every
distribution function if there are more than two bidders.17
For an even number of bidders, 2N , consider randomly pairing two groups of
N bidders and then advance the highest bidder of each pairing to the final. For
an odd number of bidders, 2N + 1, consider randomly pairing of one group of N
bidders and one group of N + 1 bidders. Bidders do not know in which group they
are selected, they only know the a priori probability of being in the group with N
bidders is 0.5. Again, the highest bidder of each pairing advances to the final. We
call this multi-stage structure a tournament, it can be seen in figure 2. We can
write MT as
MT,even =

{
N,
{
B
(N)
1
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 1
,
{
2,
{
B
(2)
1
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 2
. (52)
MT,odd =

{
{NP= 12 , N + 1P= 12 },
{
B
(N
P=1
2
,N+1
P=1
2
)
1
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 1
,
{
2,
{
B
(2)
1
}}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage 2
. (53)
As shown in Proposition 2, the payment rule we choose is not relevant for the
revenue. For the proof, we choose the first-price auction payment rule.
Proposition 4. Assume an even number of bidders 2N ≥ 4 that are loss averse in
the good domain. Assume that λ ≤ 2N−1N−1 . Then for all η ≥ 0 the revenue is higher
in the tournament than in any one-stage mechanism.
Corollary 1. Assume an even number of bidders 2N ≥ 4 that are loss averse in the
17See Ga¨chter, Johnson, and Herrmann (2007) for an empirical study on individual-level
loss aversion. They present evidence that λg lies around 2.
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Figure 2: The tournament multi-stage structure MT for four bidders.
good domain. Assume that λ ≤ 2N−1N−1 . In the case of the first-price, second-price
or all-pay auction as underlying auction format, bids are higher in the tournament
than in the corresponding one-stage mechanism for all types.
Proposition 5. Assume an odd number of bidders 2N + 1 ≥ 3 that are loss averse
in the good domain. Assume that λ ≤ 4N2N−1 . Then for all η ≥ 0 the revenue is
higher in the tournament than in any one-stage mechanism.
Corollary 2. Assume an even number of bidders 2N+1 ≥ 3 that are loss averse in
the good domain. Assume that λ ≤ 4N2N−1 . In the case of the first-price, second-price
or all-pay auction as underlying auction format, bids are higher in the tournament
than in the corresponding one-stage mechanism for all types.
Proposition 6. For λg ≤ 2, the tournament yields higher bids than the respective
one-stage auction for all types.
Consider the first-price auction payment rule. We start with the one-stage
mechanism. Assume the other bidders bid according to an increasing, absolutely
continuous bidding function βFP and let G(b) = F
(N−1)
1
(
βFP
−1
(b)
)
. The ex-
pected payment is given by
mFP (b) = G(b)b. (54)
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The utility function is given by
uFPi (vi, b|b∗) = G(b)(v − b)
+G(b)(1−G(b∗))ηgv
+ (1−G(b))G(b∗)ηgλg(−v).
(55)
The bidding function βFP constitutes a UPE if and only if the utility function
uFPi (vi, b|βFP (vi)) attains its maximum at b = βFP (vi) for all vi. Differentiating
uFP with respect to b and plugging in the equilibrium condition b = βFP (vi) yields
the ODE,
βFP
′
(vi)F1(vi) + β
FP (vi)f1(vi)
!
= vif1(vi)
(
1 + (1− F1(vi)) ηg + F1ηgλg
)
(56)
This ODE admits a closed form solution,
βFP (vi) =
1
F1(vi)
∫ vi
0
sf1(s)
(
1 + ηg + F1(s)η
g(λg − 1)
)
ds (57)
=
1
F1(vi)
∫ vi
0
sf1(s)
(
1 + ηg
(
1− F1(s)
)
+ ηgλgF1(s)
)
ds. (58)
The equilibrium bidding function for the tournament can be derived explicitly, too.
With Proposition 1, we can assume bidders bid the same in every stage. Assume
that the other bidders bid according to an increasing, absolutely continuous bidding
function βT . In the first stage, bidder i advances if he beats his N − 1 opponents.
This yields
φ1 ◦ F = F (N−1)1 . (59)
This implies that advancing to the second stage is not informative in any way about
the value of the remaining opponent. The intuition behind this can be understood
by considering the mechanism with four bidders. Given the bidder won the first
round, he may have beaten his toughest opponent already. But he also might have
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beaten the second or third highest bidding one,
Prob(get to 2nd round with b) (60)
=
1
3
F1(β
T−1(b)) +
2
3
(1
2
F2(β
T−1(b)) +
1
2
F3(β
T−1(b))
)
(61)
= F (βT
−1
(b)). (62)
Given that the bidder reached stage two, the bidder wins if he beats the winner of
the second group given he got there,
φ2 ◦ F ◦ βT−1(b) = Prob
(
b > βT
(
v
(N)
1
) ∣∣∣ b > βT (v(N−1)1 )) (63)
=
F
(N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N−1)
1
(
βT−1(b)
) (64)
= F
(N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
. (65)
As mentioned before, we have mT (b) = F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
b. Then the utility is given
by
uT (vi, b|b∗) = F (2N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
v − b
)
+ F
(2N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgvi
+ F
(2N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N)1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgvi
+
(
1− F (N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
))
F
(2N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi)
+
(
F
(N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
− F (2N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
))
F
(N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi).
(66)
We are interested in finding the equilibrium bidding function for this multi-stage
auction. Our equilibrium concept is UPE, this implies that the first-order condition
is given by (
∂uT (vi, b|b∗)
∂b
)∣∣∣∣∣
b∗=βT (vi)
!
= 0. (67)
24
We have
∂
∂b
uT (vi, b|b∗)
∣∣∣
b∗=βT (vi)
= f
(2N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
v − b
) 1
βT ′(βT−1(b))
− F (2N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
+ f
(2N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N−1)1 (vi)
)
ηgvi
1
βT ′(βT−1(b))
+ f
(2N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N)1 (vi)
)
ηgvi
1
βT ′(βT−1(b))
+ f
(N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(2N−1)
1 (vi) η
gλgvi
1
βT ′(βT−1(b))
− f (N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N)
1 (vi) η
gλgvi
1
βT ′(βT−1(b))
+ f
(2N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N)
1 (vi) η
gλgvi
1
βT ′(βT−1(b))
.
(68)
In equilibrium it holds that b = βT (vi). The resulting ordinary differential equation
for βT admits a closed-form solution,
βT (vi) =
1
F
(2N−1)
1 (vi)
∫ vi
0
s
[
f
(2N−1)
1 (s)
+ ηgf
(2N−1)
1 (s)
(
2− F (N−1)1 (s)− F (N)1 (s)
)
+ ηgλg
(
f
(N−1)
1 (s)F
(2N−1)
1 (s)
− f (N−1)1 (s)F (N)1 (s)
+ f
(2N−1)
1 (s)F
(N)
1 (s)
)]
ds.
(69)
For βT (vi) ≥ βFP (vi) to hold for all vi, a sufficient condition is that we can
rank the arguments of the integrals. As a reminder, βFP (vi) is given by
βFP (vi) =
1
F1(vi)
∫ vi
0
sf1(s)
(
1 + ηg
(
1− F1(s)
)
+ ηgλgF1(s)
)
ds, (70)
with F1 = F
(2N−1)
1 and f1 = f
(2N−1)
1 . Note that the first term stemming from
the standard preferences equilibrium bidding function is identical in both bidding
functions. What is left are the gain-loss utility terms. This means it has to hold
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that
ηgf
(2N−1)
1 (s)
(
2− F (N−1)1 (s)− F (N)1 (s)
)
−ηgf (2N−1)1 (s)
(
1− F1(s)
)
+ηgλg
(
f
(N−1)
1 (s)F
(2N−1)
1 (s)− f (N−1)1 (s)F (N)1 (s)
+f
(2N−1)
1 (s)F
(N)
1 (s)
)
−ηgλgηgf (2N−1)1 (s)F1(s)
!≥ 0.
(71)
Note that all terms, except the third one, include f
(2N−1)
1 (s) = (2N−1)F 2N−2(s)f(s).
Using the definition of the first-order statistic density for distribution functions, we
have
f
(N−1)
1 (s)F
(2N−1)
1 (s) = (N − 1)FN−2(s)f(s)F 2N−1(s) (72)
=
N − 1
2N − 1(2N − 1)F
2N−2(s)f(s)FN−1 (73)
=
N − 1
2N − 1f
(2N−1)
1 (s)F
(N−1)
1 . (74)
Similarly, we can write the third term as
f
(N−1)
1 (s)F
(2N−1)
1 (s)− f (N−1)1 (s)F (N)1 (s) + f (2N−1)1 (s)F (N)1 (s) (75)
= f
(2N−1)
1 (s)
(
N − 1
2N − 1F
(N−1)
1 (s)−
N − 1
2N − 1 + F
(N)
1 (s)
)
. (76)
With this, (71) simplifies to
(λg − 1)F (N)1 (s)

(
1− F (N−1)1 (s)
)
−
(
N − 1
2N − 1λ
g − 1
)


(
1− F (N−1)1 (s)
) !≥ 0 (77)
⇔ (λg − 1)F (N)1 (s)−
N − 1
2N − 1λ
g + 1
!≥ 0 (78)
⇒ N − 1
2N − 1λ
g − 1 !≤ 0 (79)
⇔ λg !≤ 2N − 1
N − 1 . (80)
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To prove the corollary, we define
γOS(s) = s
(
1 + ηg
(
1− F1(s)
)
+ ηgλgF1(s)
)
. (81)
Note that γOS is given by the argument of the integral of βFP . Similarly, define
γT as the argument of the integral of βT . Note that we have shown under which
conditions it holds that γOS(s) ≤ γT (s). It is straightforward to compute that in
the case of the second-price auction payment rule, bidding functions are given by
βSP (v) = γOS(v) (82)
βT (v) = γT (v). (83)
In the case of the all-pay auction, the bidding functions are given by
βSP (v) =
∫ v
0
γOS(s)f1(s)ds (84)
βT (v) =
∫ v
0
γT (s)f1(s)ds. (85)
Combining the results from this section concludes the proof to the corollary.
Again, we consider the first-price auction payment rule. We derive the equi-
librium bidding function for the tournament with an odd number of bidders in a
similar way as for an even number of bidders.
With proposition 1, we can assume bidders bid the same in every stage. Assume
the other bidders bid according to an increasing, absolutely continuous bidding
function βT . In the group with N bidders, a bidder advances if he beats his N − 1
paired opponents. This yields
φ1 ◦ F = FN−1. (86)
Given that the bidder reached stage two, the bidder wins if he beats the winner of
the second group with N + 1 bidders, given he got there,
φ2 ◦ F ◦ βT−1(b) = F (N+1)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
. (87)
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In the group with N + 1 bidders, a bidder advances if he beats his N paired
opponents. This yields
φ1 ◦ F = FN . (88)
Given that the bidder reached stage two, the bidder wins if he beats the winner of
the second group with N bidders, given he got there,
φ2 ◦ F ◦ βT−1(b) = F (N)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
. (89)
Again we have mT (b) = F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
b. Then the utility is given by
uT (vi, b|b∗) = F (2N)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
v − b
)
+
1
2
[
F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgvi
+ F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N+1)1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgvi
+
(
1− F (N−1)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
))
F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi)
+ F
(N−1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N+1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi)
− F (2N)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N+1)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi)
]
+
1
2
[
F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N)1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgvi
+ F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)(
1− F (N)1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgvi
+
(
1− F (N)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
))
F
(2N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi)
+ F
(N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi)
− F (2N)1
(
βT
−1
(b)
)
F
(N)
1
(
βT
−1
(b∗)
)
(−ηgλgvi)
]
.
(90)
The bracketed expression starting in the second line accounts for the case the bidder
is sorted into the N -bidder group, the bracketed expression starting in the seventh
line accounts for the case the bidder is sorted into the N + 1-bidder group. We are
interested in finding the equilibrium bidding function for this multi-stage auction.
Our equilibrium concept is UPE, this implies that the first-order condition is given
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by (
∂uT (vi, b|b∗)
∂b
)∣∣∣∣∣
b∗=βT (vi)
!
= 0. (91)
Leaving out the arguments of the functions for the sake of readability, we have
βT
′
(βT
−1
) · ∂
∂b
uT (vi, b|b∗)
∣∣∣
b∗=βT (vi)
= f
(2N)
1
(
v − b
)
− F (2N−1)1 βT
′
(βT
−1
)
+
1
2
[
f
(2N)
1
(
1− F (N−1)1
)
ηgvi + f
(2N)
1
(
1− F (N+1)1
)
ηgvi
+ f
(N−1)
1 F
(2N)
1 η
gλgvi −
(
f
(N−1)
1 − f (2N)1
)
F
(N+1)
1 η
gλgvi
]
+
1
2
[
f
(2N)
1
(
1− F (N)1
)
ηgvi + f
(2N)
1
(
1− F (N)1
)
ηgvi
+ f
(N)
1 F
(2N)
1 η
gλgvi −
(
f
(N)
1 − f (2N)1
)
F
(N)
1 η
gλgvi
]
.
(92)
In equilibrium it holds that b = βT (vi). The resulting ordinary differential equation
for βT admits a closed form solution,
βT (vi) =
1
F
(2N)
1 (vi)
∫ vi
0
s
[
f
(2N)
1 (s)
+
ηg
2
f
(2N)
1 (s)
(
4− F (N−1)1 (s)− F (N+1)1 (s)− 2F (N)1 (s)
)
+
ηgλg
2
(
f
(N−1)
1 (s)F
(2N)
1 (s) + f
(N)
1 (s)F
(2N)
1 (s)
−
(
f
(N−1)
1 (s)− f (2N)1 (s)
)
F
(N+1)
1 (s)
−
(
f
(N)
1 (s)− f (2N)1 (s)
)
F
(N)
1 (s)
)]
ds.
(93)
Again, as a sufficient condition we want to show that we can rank the arguments
of the integrals. The equilibrium bidding function of the first-price auction is now
given by
βFP (vi) =
1
F
(2N)
1 (vi)
∫ vi
0
sf
(2N)
1 (s)
(
1+ηg
(
1−F (2N)1 (s)
)
+ηgλgF
(2N)
1 (s)
)
ds. (94)
As before, the first term stemming from the standard preferences equilibrium bid-
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ding function is identical in both bidding functions. What is left are the gain-loss
utility terms. This means it has to hold that,
ηg
2
f
(2N)
1 (s)
(
4− F (N−1)1 (s)− F (N+1)1 (s)− 2F (N)1 (s)
)
−ηgf (2N)1 (s)
(
1− F (2N)1 (s)
)
+
ηgλg
2
[
f
(N−1)
1 (s)F
(2N)
1 (s) + f
(N)
1 (s)F
(2N)
1 (s)
−
(
f
(N−1)
1 (s)− f (2N)1 (s)
)
F
(N+1)
1 (s)
−
(
f
(N)
1 (s)− f (2N)1 (s)
)
F
(N)
1 (s)
]
−ηgλgηgf (2N)1 (s)F (2N)1 (s)
!≥ 0.
(95)
Note that all terms, except the third one, include f
(2N)
1 (s) = 2NF
2N (s)f(s). Us-
ing the definition of the first-order statistic density for distribution functions and
leaving the arguments of the functions out, we can write the third term as
f
(N−1)
1 F
(2N)
1 + f
(N)
1 F
(2N)
1 −
(
f
(N−1)
1 − f (2N)1
)
F
(N+1)
1
−
(
f
(N)
1 − f (2N)1
)
F
(N)
1
= f
(2N)
1
(
N − 1
2N
F
(N−1)
1 +
1
2
F
(N)
1 −
N − 1
2N
+ F
(N+1)
1 −
1
2
+ F
(N)
1
)
.
(96)
This inequality can be solved analytically for three bidders and has to be solved
numerically for more than three bidders. For three bidders the inequality simplifies
to
1
2
− F + 1
2
F 2 + λg
(
− 1
4
+
3
4
F − 1
2
F 2
)
!
> 0. (97)
Since only F appears, but not its argument, we can solve the inequality without
inverting F . The extremum of the left-hand side is attained at F = 3λ−44(λ−1) , but
since the coefficient of the F 2-terms is given by 12 (1− λ), this is a maximum. This
means that the minimum for valid valued of F is at F = 0 or F = 1. For F = 1,
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N 1 2 3 4 5 6
Total bidders 3 5 7 9 11 13
λcrit 2.0 2.6484 2.3995 2.2856 2.2222 2.1818
4N
2N−1 4.0 2.6667 2.4000 2.2857 2.2222 2.1818
Table 1: Critical λg values for different number of bidders.
the left-hand side is always equal to zero. For F = 0, we have
2− λ
4
!
> 0. (98)
This is fulfilled for all λ ≤ 2. For N > 1, meaning 5, 7, 9 . . . bidders, an analytic
solution is not tractable. The inequality can however be solved numerically. The
results can be found in Table 1, the code to compute the critical lambdas can be
found in Appendix 6.1.
From the proof of the case with an even number of bidders, one might expect
that the critical λg-values are given by the expression for an even number of bidders
plus half a bidder per group in expectation,
2(N + 12 )− 1
N + 12 − 1
=
4N
2N − 1 . (99)
While this expression closely approximates the critical λgs for more than four bid-
ders, the actual λg-values are somewhat smaller than this, as can be seen in Table 1.
This is due to the fact that the order statistics for the N + 1- and N -bidder groups
depend non-linearly on the number of bidders.
The corollary is proven the exact same way as in the case for an even number
of bidders.
The minimal critical λg is given by λg = 2. Together with Proposition 4 and
Proposition 5, this means that for N ≥ 3 bidders, an auctioneer is always better off
if she conducts a tournament instead of the corresponding one-stage mechanism.
Note that we derived the critical λg-values such that every type bids higher in
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the tournament than in the corresponding one-stage mechanism. If the auctioneer
is solely interested in expected revenue, then the critical λg-values are significantly
higher but depend on the distribution function and generally need to be determined
numerically.
An exception is the case for N = 4 bidders and the uniform distribution. Here,
the difference between the expected payment in tournament vs the corresponding
one-stage mechanism is given by
E
[
mT −mFP
]
=
1
840
ηg(λg + 27). (100)
This expression is strictly positive for all admissible λg and ηg, meaning that the
tournament always yields higher revenues than the corresponding one-stage mech-
anism in this setting. The same result can be derived for a total of three bidders
in the case of uniformly distributed values. For N > 4, the critical λg-values have
to be determined numerically, even for the uniform distribution.
4.4 Optimal efficient two-stage mechanism
We have already shown that the tournament poses a strict improvement over one-
stage mechanisms if the auctioneer is facing loss averse bidders. Restricting our-
selves to two stages, one might ask what the optimal efficient mechanism looks like.
In this section we derive and discuss the optimal efficient two-stage mechanism.
Proposition 7. Assume bidders are loss averse in the good domain and assume a
general two-stage mechanism
(
µ,M
)
that induces ϕ1(s) = φ1 ◦ F (s) and ϕ2(s) =
φ2 ◦ F (s). Then the expected payment of a bidder with value v is given by
mTS(v) =
∫ v
0
s
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
ds.
(101)
We start the proof by choosing the first-price payment rule. We will then use
Proposition 2 to show that we can choose any standard payment rule after we have
derived the two-stage structure M. With proposition 1, we can assume bidders bid
the same in every stage. Assume the other bidders bid according to an increasing,
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absolutely continuous bidding function βTS . Note that
ϕ1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
)
ϕ2
(
βTS
−1
(b)
)
= F1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
)
(102)
Then the utility is given by
uTS(vi, b|b∗) = F1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
)
(vi − b)
+ F1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
)(
1− ϕ1
(
βTS
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgv
+ F1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
)(
1− ϕ2
(
βTS
−1
(b∗)
))
ηgv
+
(
1− ϕ1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
))
F1
(
βTS
−1
(b∗)
)
ηgλ(−v)
+
(
ϕ1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
)
− F1
(
βTS
−1
(b)
))
ϕ2
(
βTS
−1
(b∗)
)
ηgλ(−v).
(103)
The bidding function βTS constitutes a UPE if and only if the utility function
uTSi (vi, b|βTS(vi)) attains its maximum at b = βTS(vi) for all vi. Differentiating
uTS with respect to b and plugging in the equilibrium condition b = βFP (vi) yields
the ODE
F1 (s)β
TS(s)+f1 (s)β
TS′(s) = s
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
.
(104)
It follows that
βTS(v) =
1
F1(v)
∫ v
0
s
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
ds
(105)
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and
mTS(v) =
∫ v
0
s
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
ds.
(106)
Proposition 8. Assume bidders are loss averse in the good domain and assume a
general two-stage mechanism that induces ϕ1(s) = φ1 ◦F (s) and ϕ2(s) = φ2 ◦F (s).
Then the expected revenue for the auctioneer is given by
E[R] = N
∫ 1
0
s(1− F (s))
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
ds.
(107)
Again, assume the other bidders bid according to an increasing, absolutely
continuous bidding function βTS and use the interim results of Proposition 7. Define
Γ(s) =s
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
.
(108)
The expected revenue is given by
E[R] = N
∫ 1
0
∫ v
0
Γ(s)ds f(v)dv. (109)
Partial integration yields
∫ 1
0
∫ v
0
Γ(s)ds f(v)dv =
[∫ v
0
Γ(s)ds F (v)
]v=1
v=0
−
∫ 1
0
Γ(s) F (s)ds (110)
=
∫ 1
0
Γ(s)ds−
∫ 1
0
Γ(s) F (s)ds (111)
=
∫ 1
0
(
1− F (s)
)
Γ(s)ds. (112)
Proposition 9 (Optimal two-stage structure). Assume bidders are loss averse in
the good domain. Then the optimal two-stage structure is given by
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Stage 1: With probability 1λ bidders get to the second stage with probability 1. With
probability λ−1λ only the strongest bidder advances to stage 2 and has thus
won the auction.
Stage 2: If bidders got to stage 2 with probability 1, the strongest bidder wins the
auction.
Bidders are left unaware whether the branch in which everyone advances to the
second stage was selected or if the auction took place in the first stage. The only
information they receive is whether they have reached stage two or not and after the
second stage, whether they have won the auction or not. The interpretation here is
that this mechanism induces just the right amount of risk, a bidder in stage 2 does
not know whether he beat his opponents already or if the “real” auction is yet to
come. This takes care of lower types who do not need to insure themselves against
their expectations by bidding even lower, while it encourages strong bidders to bid
even higher. The proof is structured in two parts. In a first step we optimize the
expected revenue functional for general distribution functions and ϕ1 and ϕ2. In
the second step, we show that the optimal ϕi-functions are equivalent to admissible
ϕi, meaning that they satisfy the conditions from section 3.2. Assume the other
bidders bid according to an increasing, absolutely continuous bidding function βTS
and use the interim results of Proposition 7.
We have
E[R] = N
∫ 1
0
(
1− F (s)
)
Γ(s)ds =: N
∫ 1
0
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)ds, (113)
with
Γ(s) =s
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
.
(114)
We need to find ϕ1 and ϕ2 that maximize the functional
∫ 1
0
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)ds. (115)
A candidate for the optimal ϕi is given by solving the constrained Euler-Lagrange
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equations for our functional. We will nonetheless begin with the unconstrained
Euler-Lagrange equations,

∂
∂ϕ1
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)−
d
ds
(
∂
∂ϕ
′
1
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)
)
= 0
∂
∂ϕ2
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)−
d
ds
(
∂
∂ϕ
′
2
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)
)
= 0
ϕ1(1) = 1
ϕ2(1) = 1.
(116)
The initial values of the ϕi are the only natural choice: For reasons of efficiency, the
highest possible type should always advance with certainty. The probability that
two bidders are of the highest possible type is zero. Prescribing values for ϕi(0)
could lead to distortions since it might be optimal to have an atom on 0. Note that
J does not depend on ϕ′2, so the Euler-Lagrange equations simplify to

∂
∂ϕ1
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)−
d
ds
(
∂
∂ϕ
′
1
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)
)
= 0 (a1)
∂
∂ϕ2
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2) = 0 (b1)
ϕ1(1) = 1 (a2)
ϕ2(1) = 1. (b2)
(117)
This system of ordinary differential equations is closed-form solvable for general
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distribution functions. We begin with the initial value problem (b1), (a2), (b2).

s(1− F (s))
[
− ηgf1(s) + ηgλg
(
f1(s)− ϕ′1(s)
)]
= 0 (b1)
ϕ1(1) = 1 (b2)
ϕ2(1) = 1 (b2)
(118)
⇔
 ϕ
′
1(s) =
f1(s)(λ
g − 1)
λ
(b1)
ϕ1(1) = 1 (b2)
(119)
⇒ ϕ1(s) = 1 + F1(s)(λ
g − 1)
λg
. (120)
For the second initial value problem (a1), (a2), (b2), we have

s(1− F (s))
[
− ηgf1(s)− ηgλg
(
f1(s)− ϕ′2(s)
)]
−ηgλg
(
1− F (s)− sf(s)
)(
F1(s)− ϕ2(s)
)
= 0 (b1)
ϕ1(1) = 1. (b2)
ϕ2(1) = 1. (b2)
(121)
Note that the ODE only depends on ϕ2, as was the case with (b1), (a2), (b2) and
ϕ1. After rearranging and applying the product rule, we arrive at
ϕ2(s) = F1(s)− 1
s(1− F (s))
∫ 1
s
y(1− F (y))f1(y)
λg
dy. (122)
This means that for the unconstrained optimization problem, the solution is given
by 
ϕ1(s) =
1 + F1(s)(λ
g − 1)
λg
ϕ2(s) = F1(s)− 1
s(1− F (s))
∫ 1
s
y(1− F (y))f1(y)
λg
dy.
(123)
Note that ϕ1(s)ϕs(s) 6= F1(s), meaning that these do not satisfy the conditions
from section 3.2. We now show that choosing ϕ1(s) and ϕ2(s) according to the
solutions of the unconstrained Euler-Lagrange equations is equivalent to choosing
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ϕ2(s) =
F1(s)
ϕ1(s)
.
Choosing ϕ1(s) according to (123), the expressions of
∫ 1
0
J(s, ϕ1, ϕ
′
1, ϕ2)ds that
involve ϕ2(s) are given by
∫ 1
0
s(1− F (s))ηgϕ2(s)
[
− f1(s) + λgf1(s)− λgϕ′1(s)
]
ds (124)
=
∫ 1
0
s(1− F (s))ηgϕ2(s)
[
f1(s)(λ
g − 1)−λg f1(s)(λ
g − 1)
λg
]
ds (125)
= 0. (126)
This implies that once we have chosen ϕ1(s) as the solution of the unconstrained
optimization problem and therefore independent of ϕ2(s), it does not matter which
ϕ2(s) we choose, as long as it remains measurable. Therefore our final ϕi are given
by 
ϕ1(s) =
1 + F1(s)(λ
g − 1)
λg
ϕ2(s) =
λgF1(s)
1 + F1(s)(λg − 1) .
(127)
This two-stage structure optimizes the revenue for the seller. We can even show
that bids of all types are higher than in the one-stage variants of the mechanism
and not just overall revenue.
Proposition 10. Assume bidders are loss averse in the good domain and consider
either the first-price auction, the second-price auction or the all-pay auction. Equi-
librium bids in the optimal two-stage structure are higher than in the corresponding
one-stage mechanism.
First note that replacing the ϕi in Γ by (127) yields
Γ(s) =s
(
f1(s) + η
gf1(s)
[
2− ϕ1(s)− ϕ2(s)
]
+ ηgλg
[
F1(s)ϕ
′
1(s) + f1(s)ϕ2(s)− ϕ′1(s)ϕ2(s)
])
= sf1(s)
(
1 + ηg
(
2− 1
λg
)
+ ηg
(λg − 1)2
λ
F1(s)
)
.
(128)
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Define
γOS(s) = s
(
1 + ηg
(
1− F1(s)
)
+ ηgλgF1(s)
)
(129)
γOpt(s) = s
(
1 + ηg
(
2− 1
λg
)
+ ηg
(λg − 1)2
λ
F1(s)
)
. (130)
We have
γOpt(s)
!≥ γOS(s) (131)
⇔ 2− 1
λg
+
(λg − 1)2
λ
F1(s)
!≥ 1− F1(s) + λgF1(s) (132)
⇔ F1(s)− 1
!≤ 0, (133)
which is always true. This means that the ranking holds for the first-price auction.
One can easily compute that in the case of the second-price auction as underlying
mechanism, bidding functions are given by
βSP (v) = γOS(v) (134)
βOpt(v) = γOpt(v). (135)
In the case of the all-pay auction, the bidding functions are given by
βSP (v) =
∫ v
0
γOS(s)f1(s)ds (136)
βOpt(v) =
∫ v
0
γOpt(s)f1(s)ds. (137)
This concludes the proof.
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5 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate how a buyer should design her procurement mechanism
when bidders are loss averse. Loss aversion implies that the willingness to pay of
a bidder depends on the probability he assigns to winning the auction. We show
that a simple two-stage mechanism, the tournament, outperforms any one-stage
mechanism revenue-wise if bidders are not too loss averse. As a robustness-check,
we show that the buyer’s revenue is not dependent on the payment rule she imple-
ments. Once the structure of the multi-stage mechanism is fixed, a revenue equiva-
lence principle holds. Finally, we derive the optimal, efficient two-stage mechanism.
This mechanism is, in contrast to the tournament, dependent on the degree of loss
aversion of the bidders and therefore difficult to implement in real-life procurement.
Our analysis opens the door to further research. On the one hand, it might
be interesting to investigate whether a buyer could further improve her revenue if
she were to implement a three-stage (or even more stages) mechanism. Numerical
simulations suggest that the answer is no, but the problem quickly becomes un-
tractable even for a fixed cost distribution like the uniform distribution. On the
other hand, one could expand the model to include bidders that are loss averse in
the money domain, too. The revenue equivalence principle that we derived fails in
that case, as shown by Eisenhuth and Ewers (2012). In their paper, they show that
the all-pay auction yields higher revenues than the first-price auction in a setting
similar to ours. This implies that the optimal mechanism for two or more stages
will depend on the payment rule the buyer implements, making the optimization
problem a lot harder.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Mathematica code
The code takes a starting value an then shoots λ-values until the minimum of the
function Func crosses 0.
Func[N_, l_] :=1 - x^(N - 1)  2 - x^(N + 1)  2 - x^(N) + x^(2 N) + l * ((N - 1) / (4 N)) * x^(N - 1) +
x^N  4 - ((N - 1) / (4 N)) - 1 / 4 + x^(N + 1)  2 + x^N  2 - x^(2 N)
a = 1;
step = 0.0001;
temp = 0;
startvalue = 2.153;
While[a > 0,
sumsteps = temp;
a = FindMinimum[{Func[7, startvalue + sumsteps], 0 < x < .3}, x][[1]];
temp = sumsteps + step;
If[a < 0,
Print["lambda=" <> ToString[NumberForm[startvalue + sumsteps - step, 10]]]]]
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